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wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Dubois argued that the Forest
Service's litigation position in this case was vexatious. Specifically,
Dubois noted that the Forest Service claimed artificial storage ponds at
Loon Mountain were a "practical impossibility," while at the same time
it authorized construction of a similar storage pond nearby.
Dubois claimed the district court erred in its analysis by requiring a
finding of subjective bad faith as a necessary precondition to an award
of sanctions.
The appellate court rejected this argument and
concluded that the Forest Service's conduct was not unreasonable.
Dubois raised further justifications for attorney's fees that the
appellate court refused to hear because Dubois failed to present those
same arguments to the trial court. The appellate court therefore
denied Dubois motion for attorney's fees, as it could not find any bad
faith conduct by the Forest Service.
Michael Barry

United States v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2001)
(holding the district court had discretion to decline injunctive relief to
force the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority to install a water
filtration system, despite its violation of the Surface Water Treatment
Rule promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency under the Safe Drinking Water Act, so long as the court's
judgment provided maximum feasible protection of the public
health).
The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
brought an enforcement action against the Massachusetts Water
Resources Authority ("MWRA") alleging violations of the Safe
Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") and the Surface Water Treatment Rule
("SWTR").
The United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts declined to require installation of a filtration system for
past violations, and the EPA appealed. On appeal, the EPA argued
that under the SDWA, courts have no discretion to withhold
indefinitely a provided-for remedy, such as filtration, if a public water
system has violated a substantive requirement of the SDWA.
In 1974, Congress passed the SDWA to protect the purity of the
drinking water provided by the nation's public water systems. In 1986,
Congress amended the SDWA to require the EPA to develop treatment
regimes, and to require that either the states or the EPA prosecute
violations of the SDWA and the SWTR. Through these amendments,
Congress required that all public water systems, except for systems
specifically eligible to receive a variance from the EPA, use disinfection
techniques to reduce the live quantities of pathogens in the water
supply. Congress also changed the SDWA to provide for filtration of
public water systems. Unlike the disinfection mandate, however,
Congress did not require all public water systems to employ filtration.
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instead

provided

that the EPA "shall propose

and

promulgate ...criteria under which filtration ...is required as a

treatment technique for public water systems supplied by surface water
sources."
In response to the amendments, the EPA promulgated the SWTR,
which applied the filtration requirement to public water systems that
draw some of their water from aboveground sources. The SWTR set
out eleven "avoidance criteria" for levels of certain waterborne
contaminants that all public water systems hoping to avoid installing a
filtration system must satisfy. The SWTR required that public water
systems not meeting all of the avoidance criteria by December 30,
1991, "must provide treatment consisting of both disinfection ...and
filtration" by June 29, 1993, or, if the violation occurs after December
30, 1991, within eighteen months of the violation. The EPA, however,
cannot compel a violator to comply with the SWTR through the
issuance of its own enforcement order. Rather, it must sue in federal
district court to request a remedy, such as the construction of a
filtration facility. The SDWA provides that in deciding such suits,
such judgment as protection of public health may
courts "may enter ...
require, taking into consideration the time necessary to comply and
the availability of alternative water supplies." Once a district court
finds that a public water system has violated one of the avoidance
criteria, it forever remains subject to an enforcement suit requiring
installation of a filtration system.
Established in 1984, the MWRA owns and operates the public
water system that provides most of the drinking water for the city of
Once the SWTR was
Boston and surrounding communities.
promulgated, the MWRA determined that it would not be able to
fulfill all of the avoidance criteria by the December 30, 1991 deadline.
On January 24, 1992, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Protection ("DEP") notified the MWRA that it would have to install a
filtration system by June 30, 1993. After it became clear that the
MWRA could not design and install a filtration system before June
1993, the MWRA and the DEP entered into negotiations, whereby
rather than requiring the immediate installation of a filtration system,
the MWRA could treat its water supply with disinfection, ozonation,
covered water storage facilities, and a watershed protection plan for
one of its reservoirs. On November 13, 1998, the DEP decided the
MWRA had adequately complied with the SWTR's avoidance criteria,
and concluded that the MWRA had developed satisfactory plans for
improving the quality of its water. The DEP's decision excused the
MWRA from installing a filtration system as long as the MWRA did not
violate any of the avoidance criteria, which could result in a
reimposition of the filtration requirement.
On February 12, 1998, the United States filed a lawsuit on behalf of
the EPA, which sought an injunction ordering the MWRA to comply
with the filtration requirement set out in the SDWA and the SWTR.
The EPA subsequently asked the DEP to revoke the MWRA's filtration
waiver based on this violation, but the DEP declined. The district
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court held that, based on the principle that only a "clear legislative
command" will circumvent the discretion of courts to fashion
equitable remedies, it retained discretion to determine appropriate
relief. The district court found no clear legislative command limiting
courts to mechanical enforcement of EPA compliance orders. Having
determined that it possessed the equitable discretion to withhold the
filtration remedy, the district court held that, given the lack of an
actual health issue in light of the MWRA's compliance with the
avoidance criteria at the time of trial, "any risk to public health
entailed by selection of the 'ozone-only' option is within acceptable
levels." The district court found that the MWRA's proposed treatment
plan was a "sound alternative to ... filtration when competing demands
for limited resources and the level of risk from all potential threats to
the safety of MWRA water are considered."
In its appeal, the United States argued that the district court did
not have discretion to withhold an SDWA provided remedy, namely
filtration. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
relied on the general principle that courts called upon to issue an
injunction must determine whether the equities of the case favor, and
whether the public interest would be served by, the granting of
injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has held there is a presumption
that a court has discretion whether to issue an injunction, and only a
proper showing of congressional -intent will overcome this
presumption.
In determining congressional intent, courts must
consider the language, history, structure, and the underlying
substantive policy of the legislation. Under this analysis, the court
noted that the language and structure of the SWTR regarding the
need for filtration reflect policy judgments of the EPA, not Congress,
and as such, did not demonstrate legislative intent. The court
disagreed with the United States and stated that a district court is not
required to order the substantive remedies available under the SDWA
whenever a regulation promulgated under the SDWA has been
violated. The court believed that as long as the district court issued a
judgment that ensures the public water system provides water that is
safe according to standards identified by the EPA, the court has
achieved the goal of the SDWA. Examining the language of the
SDWA's judicial-enforcement subsection, the court noted that,
following a violation of the SDWA's substantive provisions, a court
.may enter ... such judgment as protection of public health may
require...." The court focused on Congress's use of the permissive
"may" rather than language that would have required a specific
judgment to comply with the SDWA. Instead, the court found the
SDWA grants district courts the discretion to issue 'judgments as
protection of public health may require."
Furthermore, the court noted that while filtration is a requirement
under the SDWA/SWTR regime for water systems that fail to meet the
avoidance criteria, filtration is primarily a function of the SWTR, not
the SDWA. The purpose of the SDWA is to "assure that water supply
systems serving the public meet minimum national standards for
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protection of public health." Thus, the objective of the SDWA is safe
drinking water; filtration is merely one way to achieve that goal. So
long as a district court's judgment meets that SDWA goal of providing
safe drinking water, that judgment is properly within the scope of the
SDWA. The court was also satisfied with the district court's judgment
because the district court agreed to oversee the MWRA's compliance
with the filtration avoidance-criteria, thus ensuring that the MWRA's
water supply will remain safe according to the EPA's standards.
Despite the district court's finding that the SDWA contains a
"presumption expressed by Congress ...that filtration will almost

always be the preferred remedy for an SWTR violation," the court was
satisfied with the district court's decision not to issue an injunction.
The court reached this holding because the district court properly
exercised the flexibility Congress it in the statute, and assumed the
responsibility of monitoring the MWRA's compliance in the event that
future violations require a reexamination of the decision not to order
filtration. In sum, the court affirmed because the district court acted
within the scope of its authority under the SDWA and used its
equitable discretion to further the substantive purposes of the SDWA.
Kevin . Rohnstock

SECOND CIRCUIT
Catskill Mtns. Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding artificial transfers of water from one
watershed to another could constitute an actionable violation of the
Clean Water Act).
The Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited and other
recreational users of Esopus Creek (collectively "Catskill") filed suit
against the City of New York ("City") for alleged violations of the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"). Catskill claimed the City's release of water from
Schoharie Reservoir ("Reservoir") introduced "suspended solids,"
"turbidity" and "thermal discharges," into the naturally clearer and
cooler waters of the creek, all of which constituted "addition" of
pollutants under the CWA.
The Reservoir supplied drinking water to the citizens of the City by
discharging water through the Shandaken Tunnel ("the Tunnel") into
the creek, where it subsequently entered the Hudson River and flowed
south to the City. Without the Tunnel, water leaving the Reservoir
would naturally flow into the Mohawk River and would never flow into
the Creek.
The circuit court focused on the question of whether artificial
transfers of water from one watershed to another could constitute an
"addition" of pollutants actionable under the CWA. The CWA

